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Abstract In the framework of the three-party constrained voter model, where
voters of two radical parties (A and B) interact with “centrists” (C and Cζ ), we
study the competition between a persuasive majority and a committed minority.
In this model, A’s and B’s are incompatible voters that can convince centrists or
be swayed by them. Here, radical voters are more persuasive than centrists, whose
sub-population comprises susceptible agents C and a fraction ζ of centrist zealots
Cζ . Whereas C’s may adopt the opinions A and B with respective rates 1+ δA
and 1+ δB (with δA ≥ δB > 0), Cζ are committed individuals that always remain
centrists. Furthermore, A and B voters can become (susceptible) centrists C with
a rate 1. The resulting competition between commitment and persuasion is stud-
ied in the mean field limit and for a finite population on a complete graph. At
mean field level, there is a continuous transition from a coexistence phase when
ζ < ∆c = δA/(1+δA) to a phase where centrism prevails when ζ ≥ ∆c. In a finite
population of size N, demographic fluctuations lead to centrism consensus and
the dynamics is characterized by the mean consensus time τ . Because of the com-
petition between commitment and persuasion, here consensus is reached much
slower (ζ < ∆c) or faster (ζ ≥ ∆c) than in the absence of zealots (when τ ∼ N). In
fact, when ζ < ∆c and there is an initial minority of centrists, the mean consensus
time grows as τ ∼ N−1/2eNγ , with N ≫ 1 and γ = δA−ζ (1+ ln(δA/ζ ))+O(δ 2A).
The dynamics is thus characterized by a metastable state where the most persua-
sive voters and centrists coexist when δA > δB, whereas all species coexist when
δA = δB. When ζ ≥ ∆c and the initial density of centrists is low, one finds τ ∼ lnN
(when N ≫ 1). Our analytical findings are corroborated by stochastic simulations.
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1 Introduction
Opinion dynamics aims at understanding how cultural change evolves [1,2,3].
This issue is closely related to problems arising in various disciplines in the life
and behavioral sciences [4], and the recent years have witnessed a growing activity
in applying the tools of statistical physics to their description [3,5]. In models of
opinion dynamics, each agent is typically represented by its “opinion” state (often
labeled as a spin variable [6]) that is updated in response to the opinion of a lo-
cal neighborhood, a mechanism of cultural dynamics documented in sociological
studies, see e.g. [7,8]. Basic issues in opinion dynamics concern the time neces-
sary for a consensus to be attained and the period during which cultural diversity
is maintained [3,5]. These questions are usually addressed by considering simple
and insightful models, like the influential two-state voter model (VM), in which
local opinions are copied and spread by imitation, see Sec. 2 below. It has recently
been proposed that the evolution of cultural diversity would be more realistically
described by models where the seek for consensus is limited by some form of in-
compatibility [1,2]. This idea has been investigated in an analytically amenable
three-party constrained voter model (3CVM) [9,10,11] (see also Ref. [12]).
In this work, we generalize the 3CVM to study the competition between a
persuasive majority and a committed minority. In our model, as in Refs. [9,10,
11], the voters of two radical parties (A and B) are incompatible and do not interact
among them, but they interact with a third species (“centrists”, C and Cζ ). Here,
radical A and B voters are considered to be more persuasive than centrists, whose
sub-population comprises susceptible agents (C) and a small fraction ζ of “centrist
zealots” (Cζ ). The latter are committed individuals that always remain centrists,
while a susceptible centrist adopts the opinion A with rate 1+δA when it interacts
with an A-voter, and the opinion B with rate 1+δB when it interacts with a B-voter.
Furthermore, each A and B individuals can become a (susceptible) centrist with
rate 1. The parameters δA ≥ δB > 0 hence represent the persuasion biases toward A
and B, i.e. the respective persuasion strength of these radical voters. The dynamics
is thus characterized by a competition between the persuasion strength of A and
B voters opposed by the resistance of centrist zealots (Cζ ). The questions that
we address with this model are the following: (i) When and how does a committed
minority prevail against a persuasive majority? (ii) How does the mean consensus
time vary with the fraction of zealots and the persuasion biases?
These questions are answered by studying the generalized 3CVM’s properties
in the mean field limit and for a finite population of size N on a complete graph. In
the absence of fluctuations, we find that more than one opinion coexists when ζ is
below a critical threshold ∆c = δA/(1+δA), while centrism prevails when ζ ≥ ∆c.
The dynamics is markedly different when the size of the population is finite and
the demographic fluctuations drive the system into centrism consensus in a time
3that depends non-trivially on δA,δB,ζ and N. The mean consensus time in a large
population with an initial minority of centrists is here shown to grow dramatically
as τ ∼ N−1/2eNγ(δA,ζ ) when ζ < ∆c, and as τ ∼ lnN when ζ ≥ ∆c. These results,
derived using the Fokker-Planck equation and the WKB approach, are in stark
contrast with the mean consensus time obtained in the absence of centrist zealots
(when τ ∼ N [10,11]). Our findings, corroborated by stochastic simulations, thus
demonstrate that the presence of centrism zealotry either significantly slows down
(ζ < ∆c) or speeds up (ζ ≥ ∆c) the approach to consensus.
While some aspects of the influence of committed agents in opinion dynamics
have been considered in the literature, e.g. in Refs. [13,14,15,16,17] (see Sec. 2),
this work differs from earlier studies in various respects: (i) We here consider a
three-party (four-state) model whereas most of previous works, like Refs. [13,
14,15,16,17], focused on two-state systems. (ii) Here, we study the competition
between the degree of commitment in the population and the persuasion strength
of two types of voters (three independent parameters), while no persuasion bias
was considered in [15,16,17]. (iii) Furthermore, whereas most of the previous
results were obtained in the mean field limit [16] or by means of numerical simu-
lations [17], the exponent γ(δA,ζ ) is here obtained analytically.
This paper is organized as follows: Next Section is dedicated to a brief review
of the voter model and some of its variants, while the 3CVM with centrist zealots
is introduced in Section 3. The mean field dynamics of such a model is discussed in
Section 4. The section 5 is dedicated to the stochastic formulation of the dynamics
in a finite population. The mean consensus time in the case of identical persuasion
biases is studied in Section 6. In particular, the case of the long-lived coexistence
of opinions and metastability is studied in terms of the Fokker-Planck equation
(Sec. 6.1.1) and with the WKB method (Sec. 6.1.2). The mean consensus time in
the general case of asymmetric persuasion biases is analyzed in Section 7. In the
final section, our findings are summarized and our conclusions presented.
2 A brief review of the voter model and some of its variants: zealotry,
commitment and incompatibility
As a contribution to a special issue on the “applications of statistical mechanics to
social phenomena”, this work is dedicated to the study of the competition between
commitment and persuasion in the three-party constrained voter model. Before
presenting our new findings, it is useful to begin by providing some background
material in the form of a brief review of some basic models and results.
Since the pioneering works by Schelling and Granovetter [7,8], the impor-
tance of relying on individual-based models to relate “micro-level to macro-level
interactions” [8] in social dynamics has been recognized. As an inspiring example
of this type of modeling approach, Schelling showed how homophily, that is the
tendency of an individual to being bond with neighbors sharing similar character-
istics, is important to understand the formation of social segregation [7].
In this context, the voter model (VM) [6] is one of the simplest and most paradig-
matic individual-based models of opinion dynamics. The VM describes how a
socially interacting population of individuals possessing a discrete set of states
(“opinions”) evolves toward consensus as the result of interactions between neigh-
4bors and local fluctuations of the population composition. The VM is closely re-
lated to the Ising model of statistical physics with the Glauber kinetics at zero
temperature [18,19]1, and also to the Moran model [20] commonly used to de-
scribe evolutionary dynamics in the life and behavioral sciences [4]2. In the clas-
sic two-state VM, each node of a graph is occupied by a “voter” in one of the
two possible state, e.g. denoted A or B (or +/−, ↑ / ↓, or “leftist/rightist”). These
voters can be interpreted as having no self confidence and changing their state by
simply adopting the opinion of a neighbor. Hence, in its simplest form the VM
evolves according to the following rules:
– Pick a random voter.
– The selected voter adopts the opinion of one of its random neighbor.
– These steps are repeated until a consensus (where all individuals are of the
same opinion, either all leftists or all rightists) is necessarily reached.
In the language of statistical physics, these rules and the VM define a Markov
chain with absorbing states that is aptly described by a master equation [22]. One
of the most appealing features of the VM is its mathematical tractability. Indeed, it
is one of the rare models of non-equilibrium statistical physics to be exactly solv-
able in any dimensions on regular lattices, and many of its properties are known
analytically, see e.g. [3,19,22]. The most significant features of the VM are (i)
the probability to attain a specific consensus state, (ii) the mean time to reach a
consensus, and (iii) the two-point correlation function G (r, t).
i. The consensus probability EA(x) (also called “exit probability”, or “fixation
probability” by analogy with the evolutionary dynamics literature [4]) is the
probability that a finite system consisting of an initial density x of A-voters
eventually reaches the consensus state where all voters are in the state A. As
the average opinion, also called “magnetization”, is conserved by the VM on
any degree-regular graphs (like lattices and complete graphs), and since the
VM always reaches consensus, one has EA(x) = x on any regular graphs.
ii. On degree-regular graphs, it is known that the mean consensus time τ (also
called “mean exit time” or “mean fixation time”) in a population of N voters
scales as τ ∼ N2 in one dimension (d = 1) and as τ ∼ N lnN in two dimen-
sions (d = 2), whereas in dimensions d > 2 one has τ ∼ N (complete graphs
correspond to d = ∞). This implies that d = 2 is the upper critical dimension
of the VM. Moreover, it has recently been shown that the mean consensus
time scales sublinearly with N on degree-heterogeneous graphs characterized
by nodes of high-degree, i.e. τ ∼ Nα , where 0 < α < 1 depends non-trivially
on the network’s degree-distribution [21] 3.
1 These models are equivalent on one-dimensional lattices, but not in higher dimensions
where the Ising-Glauber model follows a majority rule, whereas the VM evolves according to a
a proportional rule. As a consequence, while there is a surface tension in the two-dimensional
Ising-Glauber model this is not the case for the VM, see [3,19] and references therein.
2 The voter and Moran models are equivalent on regular graphs but lead to markedly different
dynamics on degree-heterogeneous networks, see e.g. [21].
3 It has also been shown that a class of models with voter-like dynamics and describing coop-
eration dilemmas are characterized by anomalous metastability on scale-free networks, with the
mean consensus time and exit probability exhibiting a stretched exponential dependence on the
the population size and an exponent depending non-trivially of the degree distribution [23].
5iii. Significant insight into the spatial distribution of opinions is provided by the
two-point correlation function G (r, t). This quantity informs on the probability
that two voters separated by a distance r are in the same state at time t . On lat-
tices of dimension d, G (r, t →∞) decays asymptotically as rd−2 in high dimen-
sions (d > 2). In low dimensions the spatial organization of the VM is charac-
terized by coarsening, i.e. the slow formation of growing domains of a single
opinion. As a consequence, the two-point correlation function asymptotically
approaches the value 1 in low dimensions. More precisely, when t → ∞ and
0 < r <
√
t, one finds 1−G (r, t)∼ r/√t in d = 1 and 1−G (r, t)∼ lnr/ ln t in
d = 2 [24].
While the VM has proved to be insightful and influential, it relies on oversim-
plified assumptions like the total lack of self-confidence of all voters and the un-
avoidable formation of a consensus. In fact, since Granovetter’s seminal work on
“threshold models” [8], the influence on social dynamics of the population’s het-
erogeneous response to stimuli is well established. In the opinion dynamics con-
text, as a step toward the investigation of a simple model describing the dynamics
of a heterogeneous population with different levels of confidence, we have pro-
posed to investigate the two-state voter model in the presence of “zealots” [13,14,
15]. The zealotry is implemented by assuming that a small fraction of the popula-
tion consists of committed individuals (called zealots) that either favor a specific
state (A or B) as in Refs. [13,14], or adopt an opinion that never changes as in
Ref. [15]. As a consequence of zealotry, the magnetization is not conserved in the
VM with zealots, and the main features of these models are the following:
– In Ref. [13] it was shown that on low-dimensional lattices (when d ≤ 2) a
single zealot with a favored opinion (i.e. a voter with a bias toward one opin-
ion, but whose state is not fixed) imposes the consensus in its favored state to
an infinite group of voters, whereas in higher dimension the magnetization is
non-uniform and decays with the distance from the zealot. Furthermore, the
unanimity state imposed by the zealot is approached algebraically in one di-
mension, as t−1/2, and much slower in two dimensions (∼ 1/ ln t). It has also
been shown that on a finite lattice of size N = Ld (where L is the lattice lin-
ear size), the time necessary for the zealot’s opinion to spread is N2 is d = 1,
N lnN in d = 2, and N in higher dimensions.
– Ref. [14] was dedicated to the study of the VM in the presence of a small group
of n zealots, each with a favored opinion and a specific bias toward its preferred
state. The competition between zealots of different types was shown to prevent
the formation of consensus and to lead to a non-trivial fluctuating steady state
whose properties were investigated by exploiting a formal analogy with the
electrostatic potential generated by n classical point charges. The approach
toward the steady state was shown to be algebraic (∼ t−1/2) and logarithmic
(∼ 1/ ln t) in one and two dimensions, respectively, and to be characterized by
the formation of growing domains when the density of zealots is very small,
i.e. n/N ≪ 1. In this case, the size of the single-opinion domains was found to
grow with the system size but to never span entirely the system.
– The voter model with a finite (but small) fraction n/N of zealots that never
change opinion has been studied in Ref. [15]. The study was carried out on
complete graphs and on low-dimensional lattices with randomly distributed
6zealots (of both types). It was thus shown that in all cases a small fraction of
zealots is effective in maintaining a reactive state characterized by a Gaussian
magnetization distribution with a width that decays as n−1/2.
The influence of committed agents in opinion dynamics has also been considered
in other two-opinion dynamics models, see e.g. Refs. [16,17,25,26]:
– The case of a committed minority of “inflexibles” in a two-state majority-rule
model has been considered at mean field level in Ref. [16], where it was shown
that an equal densities of inflexibles of each type prevent consensus from being
achieved.
– The authors of Ref. [17] studied how the mean consensus time varies with
the fraction of committed individuals in a two-opinion variant of the naming
game [28] called the binary agreement model. In the model of Ref. [17], the
population initially consists of a majority of individuals of one opinion and
a fraction p of individuals of the other species. As in Ref. [15], the latter are
committed individuals that never change state and impose their consensus after
a mean time showed to grow exponentially or logarithmically with the popu-
lation size, depending on whether p is below or above a critical threshold [17].
– The authors of [25] considered the confident voter model, in which each voter
has two levels of commitment (“confident” and “unsure”) for each of the two
possible opinions. The confident VM has been studied in the mean field limit,
where the mean consensus time is τ ∼ lnN, whereas in one and two dimen-
sions the mean consensus time scales respectively as τ ∼N2 and τ ∼N3/2 [25].
– Furthermore, the heterogeneous voter model in which each agent has its own
intrinsic rate to change state has been considered in Ref. [26], where it was
found that the time until consensus is reached is much longer in the heteroge-
neous VM than in the classic voter model.
It is also worth noting that the influence on cooperation dilemmas of zealot-like
individuals has recently been studied in the framework of evolutionary games [27].
In addition to voter-like models with committed individuals, there are vari-
ous prototypical opinion dynamics models, whose outcome is characterized by
a lack of consensus. Influential models of this type are the multiple-state Axel-
rod model [1] and the bounded compromise model [2]. The key feature prevent-
ing consensus in these models is a form of incompatibility: when the opinions
of two agents are too different, they are deemed to be incompatible and there is
no interaction between such individuals. This can lead to cultural fragmentation
and a frozen stationary state where a mixture of incompatible states coexist. In its
essence, the feature of incompatibility is captured by the so-called three-party con-
strained voter model (3CVM) that can be regarded as a discrete three-state version
of the bounded compromise model [9,10]. In the 3CVM, there is no interaction
between species A (“leftists”) and B (“rightists”) that are are incompatible. How-
ever, A- and B-voters interact with a third species C, and thus compete to impose
their own consensus according to the following rules:
– A centrist C can become an A-voter or a B-voter with rate 1+ δ ′ (and 0 ≤
|δ ′| ≤ 1);
– A and B voters can become centrists C with a rate 1;
– A and B voters do not interact: AB→ AB,
7where δ ′ is a bias favoring either A and B (when δ ′ > 0), or C (when δ ′ < 0).
The 3CVM admits three absorbing fixed points, corresponding to the consensus
with A,B and C, and a “polarization line” along which a frozen mixture of non-
interacting A’s and B’s coexist. This 3CVM has been solved analytically on a
complete graph and the probabilities of reaching each consensus state and the
polarization line were determined, both when δ ′ = 0 [10] and in the case δ ′ 6=
0 [11]. Within an approach based on the Fokker-Planck equation [22], it was also
shown that the mean exit times in the 3CVM scale linearly with the population size
N when the intensity of the bias is weak (i.e. when N|δ ′| ≪ 1 and N ≫ 1) [10,
11]. The 3CVM has also investigated on regular lattices and found to exhibit slow
kinetics in low dimensions [9] (see also [12]).
Aiming to study how the maintenance of cultural diversity is affected by the
competition between persuasion and commitment, in this work we consider a
three-party (four-state) opinion dynamics model that combines the main features
of both the 3CVM and VM with zealots. The resulting model, whose detailed
specification is given in the next section, is here used to study the competition
between two radical opinions (A and B) that are incompatible and the voters of a
third party that are less persuasive but on average more committed than A’s and
B’s.
3 The three-party constrained voter model with centrist zealots
In this work, we introduce and study a three-party constrained voter model with
centrist zealots on a complete graph (used for its tractability and because it is ar-
guably a natural first choice in the context of social dynamics). Like the 3CVM [9,
10,11], this model is characterized by a population of N individuals, j are of
species A, k of type B and ℓ are “susceptible” centrists (species C). Moreover,
the population also comprises ℓζ committed centrists (zealots), denoted Cζ , that
never change opinion, as in [15]. Hence, one has N = j+ k+ ℓ+ ℓζ , with a fixed
fraction ζ ≡ ℓζ/N of zealots Cζ . In the language of the voter model (see Sec. 2),
the individuals of species A (“leftists”) and B (“rightists”) are voters of two radi-
cal parties, while supporters of the third party (“centrism”) are either susceptible
centrists (species C) or centrist zealots (type Cζ ). As in the 3CVM, radical opin-
ions are incompatible and there are no interactions between A’s and B’s, but these
voters interact with a centrist neighbor according to the following evolutionary
rules:
1. A susceptible centrist C can become an A-voter with rate 1+δA and a B-voter
with rate 1+δB;
2. A- and B-voters can become susceptible centrists with a rate 1;
3. A- and B-voters do not interact: AB→ AB;
4. Centrist zealots Cζ always remain in this state.
In the spirit of the VM and 3CVM, the dynamics of the system is thus implemented
as follows:
(i) At each time-step a pair of (“neighboring”) voters is randomly picked;
8(ii) if an A/B-centrist pair is picked, the population composition changes accord-
ing to the following schematic moves:
AC → AA with rate 1+δA
BC → BB with rate 1+δB (1)
AC →CC and ACζ →CCζ with rate 1
BC →CC and BCζ →CCζ with rate 1;
(iii) if the randomly picked pair of neighbors consists of two radical voters (AA,BB
or AB) or two centrists (CC,CCζ or CζCζ ), the composition of the population
does not change;
(iv) these steps are iterated until centrism consensus is necessarily reached (see
below).
In this work, we assume the existence of persuasion biases (or persuasion
strengths) δA > 0 and δB > 0 toward opinions A and B, respectively. The quantities
δA/B measure the biases toward opinions A/B (against centrism) and thus reflect
that A and B voters are more persuasive than centrists. Here, without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that δA ≥ δB > 0. The limiting case ℓζ = δA = δB = 0 corresponds
to the 3CVM without zealots and no bias that was studied in Ref. [10], while the
3CVM with a symmetric bias but without zealots of Ref. [11] is recovered when
ℓζ = 0,δA = δB 6= 0.
From the rules (1), we expect a subtle competition between A and B voters,
favored by their persuasion biases and seeking to impose their consensus, and
centrist zealots that resist the spread of A’s and B’s and strive to promote centrism.
We are particularly interested in such a competition when centrists are initially
in the minority and the population is finite. In this situation, we will study the
circumstances under which a committed minority can prevail against a persuasive
majority. Another question of great interest concerns how the competition between
persuasion and commitment leads to a long-lived (metastable) coexistence state
along with the maintenance of a form of cultural diversity. These issues are studied
in the mean field limit (Sec. 4) and in finite populations (Secs. 5-7).
4 Mean field analysis
At mean field level, one assumes a population of infinite size (N → ∞) and ignore
any random fluctuations. Hence, the densities a ≡ j/N,b ≡ k/N and c ≡ ℓ/N,
and the fraction ζ ≡ ℓζ/N of (centrist) zealots, are treated as continuous variables
obeying the following rate equations (REs):
d
dt a(t) = a(t) [δA c(t)−ζ ]
d
dt
b(t) = b(t) [δB c(t)−ζ ]. (2)
The total population size being conserved, one has c(t) = 1− ζ − (a(t)+ b(t)).
Substituting this expression into (2) yields two coupled equations whose proper-
ties are discussed below, first in the case of asymmetric biases and then when the
9Fig. 1 Schematic phase portrait of the mean field dynamics (2). (a) Asymmetric biases δA >
δB > 0: when ζ < ∆c, only the coexistence state (•) corresponding to a population of A-voters
and centrists is stable (flows in dashed arrows), while the fixed point associated with centrism
consensus (◦) is unstable. When ζ < δB/(1+ δB) (as in this sketch), there is also an unstable
coexistence state (⋄) consisting of B-voters and centrists. When ζ > ∆c, the only stable fixed
point corresponds to the centrism consensus (dotted arrows). (b) Identical biases δA = δB = δ >
0: the fixed point (a∗,b∗,c∗) (•) associated with the coexistence of the three parties is stable
when ζ < ∆c (flows in dashed arrows) and unstable otherwise (dotted arrows). See text.
biases δA and δB are identical. In fact, we readily notice from (2) that in the ab-
sence of bias (δA = δB = 0), the system quickly evolves toward a population com-
prising only centrists, whereas an interesting situation arises when δA ≥ δB > 0.
4.1 Mean field dynamics with asymmetric biases
When δA > δB > 0, the mean field equations (2) are characterized by three fixed
points (a,b,c) t→∞−→ (a∗i ,b∗i ,c∗i ) with i ∈ (1,2,3):
(a∗1,b∗1,c∗1) = (0,0,1−ζ ),
(a∗2,b∗2,c∗2) = (1−ζ − ζδA ,0,
ζ
δA
), (3)
(a∗3,b∗3,c∗3) = (0,1−ζ − ζδB ,
ζ
δB
).
The non-trivial fixed point (a∗2,b∗2,c∗2) physically exists and is asymptotically sta-
ble when ζ < ∆c ≡ δA/(1+ δA). Otherwise, (a∗1,b∗1,c∗1) is the only stable fixed
point when ζ ≥ ∆c. Furthermore, there is also another coexistence fixed point
(a∗3,b∗3,c∗3) when ζ < δB/(1+δB), but a stability analysis reveals that it is always
unstable (saddle point). As illustrated in Fig. 1(a), the mean field dynamics (2)
therefore predicts that the system evolves toward the stable fixed point
(a(t),b(t),c(t)) t→∞−→ (a∗,b∗,c∗)≡
{
(a∗2,b∗2,c∗2) when ζ < ∆c and δA > δB
(a∗1,b∗1,c∗1) when ζ ≥ ∆c. (4)
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This means that in the case of asymmetric persuasion biases with δA > δB, when ζ
is below the critical threshold ∆c = δA/(1+δA), the mean field dynamics leads to
a coexistence state where the most persuasive voters (A’s) coexist with centrists. In
this case, B-voters are absent form the final state. On the other hand, when ζ ≥ ∆c
the mean field dynamics evolves toward centrism consensus, with a population
consisting only of susceptible and committed centrists.
4.2 Mean field dynamics with a identical bias δA = δB = δ > 0
When the persuasion bias toward opinions A and B is identical, i.e. δA = δB = δ >
0, the rate equations (2) can be solved exactly. In fact, by adding the equations of
(2) and using a(t)+b(t) = 1−ζ − c(t), we obtain
d
dt c(t) =−
d
dt (a(t)+b(t)) =−δ (1−ζ − c(t))[c(t)−ζ/δ ]. (5)
This equation can be readily solved and by denoting the initial densities (a(0),b(0),c(0))=
(x,y,z), when ζ 6= ∆c, one finds:
c(t) =
1−ζ +Kζ exp(δ (1−ζ −ζ/δ )t)
1+K exp(δ (1−ζ −ζ/δ )t) , (6)
where K≡ 1−z−ζδ z−ζ . When the biases toward A and B are identical, one has ddt
(
a(t)
b(t)
)
=
0, which implies that a(t)/b(t) = x/y is conserved by (2). Using this property to-
gether with (6), we obtain a(t) =
(
x
x+y
)
[1−ζ − c(t)] and b(t) = (y/x)a(t). Ac-
cording to (6), the mean field dynamics is therefore characterized by an exponen-
tially quick approach to the steady state densities (a∗,b∗,c∗), where
c(t)
t→∞−→ c∗ =
{
ζ/δ if ζ < ∆c
1−ζ if ζ > ∆c, (7)
and
a(t) =
x
y
b(t) t→∞−→ a∗ = x
y
b∗ =
{
x(1−ζ (1+δ−1))
K(δ z−ζ ) if ζ < ∆c
0 if ζ > ∆c,
(8)
as sketched in Fig. 1(b). This means that when the persuasion biases are iden-
tical, and if the density ζ of centrist zealots is below ∆c, the mean field anal-
ysis predicts the stable coexistence of A and B voters along with centrists. If
ζ > ∆c, the final state is again composed only of (susceptible and committed)
centrists. Furthermore, in the critical case ζ = ∆c, one has the long-time behav-
ior c(t)− (1+ δ )−1 ∼ (δ t)−1 when t → ∞. In this critical case one is left with a
density ζ/δ = (1+δ )−1 of susceptible centrists along with a fraction ζ of zealot
centrists, but no A and B voters.
According to these mean field results, summarized in Fig. 1, when the fraction
ζ of zealots in the population is low, the dynamics generally reaches a stationary
state where more than one species coexists. Hence, the mean field analysis predicts
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the transition from a coexistence and “multicultural” phase (ζ < ∆c) to a phase
dominated by centrism (ζ ≥ ∆c) at the critical value ζ = ∆c. As discussed in the
next sections, this picture changes drastically when the population is of finite size
and demographic fluctuations need to be taken into account.
5 Stochastic dynamics in a finite population
When the population is of finite size N, demographic (random) fluctuations signif-
icantly alter the mean field dynamics and ultimately impose the centrist consensus.
The latter is associated with the system’s unique absorbing state that consists of
N−ℓ susceptible centrists (C) and ℓζ centrist zealots (Cζ ). While the system’s fate
is known, we are here interested in the dependence of the consensus (exit) time
on the population size and on the parameters δA, δB and ζ . In particular, we study
the circumstances under which cultural diversity is maintained (long-lived coexis-
tence), and when consensus is quickly reached. These questions are addressed by
modeling the evolution with continuous-time birth-death processes.
In the general case of different persuasion biases (δA ≥ δB), at each interaction
the number of A and B voters can increase or decrease by one (i.e. j → j±1 and
k → k±1) with rates T A±j,k and T B±j,k , respectively (see (1)). The population’s com-
position therefore evolves according to a bivariate birth-death process described
by the probability P j,k(t) that at time t there are j voters of type A and a number
k of B voters in the population. This probability obeys the master equation [22]:
dP j,k(t)
dt = T
A+
j−1,kP j−1,k(t)+T
A−
j+1,kP j+1,k(t)+T
B+
j,k−1P j,k−1(t)
+ T B−j,k+1P j,k+1(t)− [TA+j,k +T A−j,k +T B+j,k +T B−j,k ]P j,k(t), (9)
where the state space is bounded since j,k ∈ [0,N− ℓζ ] and, to account for the
fact that j = k = 0 corresponds to the absorbing state with only centrists (C’s and
Cζ ’s), one has T±A0,0 = T±B0,0 = 0 and P j,k(t) = 0 for j > N− ℓζ and j < 0, and for
k > N− ℓζ and k < 0. According to (1), the transition rate T A+j,k is associated with
the reaction of the pair AC→ AA and T B+j,k with BC→ BB, while T A−j,k and T B−j,k are
respectively associated with AC/Cζ → CC/Cζ and BC/Cζ → CC/Cζ . Since the
probabilities of picking the pairs AC and ACζ are respectively jℓ/N(N − 1) and
jℓζ/N(N−1), and similarly for the pairs BC and BCζ , the transition rates read
T A+j,k = (1+δA)
j(N− ℓζ − j− k)
N(N−1) , T
A−
j,k =
j(N− j− k)
N(N−1) ,
T B+j,k = (1+δB)
k(N− ℓζ − j− k)
N(N−1) , T
B−
j,k =
k(N− j− k)
N(N−1) , (10)
where we have used j+ k = N− ℓζ − ℓ.
The mathematical treatment greatly simplifies in the case of identical persua-
sion biases, when δA = δB = δ > 0. In this case, centrists C interact in the same
manner with A and B voters (see (1)) and at each time step their number can change
by ±1 with transition rates T±ℓ , respectively. The dynamics can thus be mapped
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onto a single-variate process described in terms of the probability Pℓ(t) of finding
ℓ susceptible centrists in the population at time t . This quantity obeys the master
equation
dPℓ(t)
dt = T
+
ℓ−1Pℓ−1(t)+T
+
ℓ+1Pℓ+1(t)−
[
T+ℓ +T
−
ℓ
]
Pℓ(t), (11)
where, to account for the absorbing boundary conditions, we impose T±N−ℓζ = 0
and Pℓ(t) = 0 for ℓ > N − ℓζ and ℓ < 0. According to (1), and from the above
discussion, the interaction XC → XX , with X ∈ {A,B}, is associated with the rate
T−ℓ = T
A+
j,k +T
B+
j,k . In the same manner, T
+
ℓ corresponds to the reactions XY →CY ,
with Y ∈ {C,Cζ}, and thus T+ℓ = T A−j,k + T B−j,k . The transition rates of the master
equation (11) therefore read
T+ℓ =
(N− ℓζ − ℓ)(ℓ+ ℓζ )
N(N−1) , and T
−
ℓ = (1+δ )
(N− ℓζ − ℓ)ℓ
N(N−1) . (12)
Here we are chiefly interested in the mean consensus time (MCT) τ necessary
to reach the absorbing boundary ( j,k, ℓ)= (0,0,N−ℓζ ) starting from a population
with initial densities (a(0),b(0),c(0)) = (x,y,z), while ζ remains fixed. The MCT
will be studied both for (9,10) and (11,12). In the case of identical persuasion bi-
ases, the MCT of the birth-death process (11,12) will be obtained analytically. The
direct treatment of the process (9,10) describing the 3CVM with asymmetric per-
suasion biases is difficult, but its dynamics is exactly reproduced by the Gillespie
algorithm used in our simulations [30]. Furthermore, in Sec. 7 we will use the an-
alytical results obtained in Sec. 6 for the unbiased case to analytically characterize
the MCT also when δA > δB.
6 Mean consensus time in the 3CVM with centrist zealots and identical
persuasion biases
In this section, we study the mean consensus time (MCT) of the birth-death pro-
cess defined by (11,12) when the persuasion biases are identical, i.e. δA = δB ≡
δ > 0, and the population size N ≫ 1 is large (but finite). We consider the contin-
uum limit and treat z = ℓ/N and ζ = ℓζ/N as continuous variables. The transition
rates (12) therefore become
T+(z)≡ (1−ζ − z)(z+ζ ), and T−(z)≡ (1+δ )(1−ζ − z)z. (13)
In this setting, the MCT obeys the backward master equation [22,11]
(
T+(z)+T−(z)
)
τ(z) = ∆ +T−(z)τ(z−∆ )+T+(z)τ(z+∆ ), (14)
where the time has been rescaled according to t → t/N and ∆ ≡ N−1 (the time
increment ∆ hence matches how the density of C′s changes at each interaction).
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In principle (14) is solvable, but the formal exact solution is an unwieldy and
non-enlightening expression [22]. A more tractable and insightful approach is pro-
vided by system size expansions of (14) in powers of ∆ . In the realm of the diffu-
sion theory [29,22], one Taylor expands (14) to second order in ∆ and obtains the
backward Fokker-Planck equation (bFPE)
(T+(z)−T−(z))τ ′(z)+((T+(z)+T−(z))/2N)τ ′′(z) =−1
This bFPE holds for all single-coordinate birth-death processes [22] and, with
(13), here explicitly reads
(1−ζ − z)
[
−(δ z−ζ ) dτ(z)dz +
1
2N
{(2+δ )z+ζ} d
2τ(z)
dz2
]
=−1. (15)
This equation is supplemented by the absorbing and reflecting boundary condi-
tions τ(1− ζ ) = 0 and τ ′(0) = 0, respectively. The condition τ(1− ζ ) = 0 ac-
counts for the fact that the dynamics ends when z = 1−ζ (i.e. ℓ= N−ℓζ ) and the
centrism consensus (absorbing state) is reached. The reflecting condition τ ′(0) = 0
ensures that the system cannot be “exited” by the end z = 0 (i.e. ℓ = 0) [22].
Eq. (15) gives the MCT in the framework of the diffusion theory, which is cer-
tainly an accurate approximation when the intensity of the deterministic drift is
much less than the intensity of the fluctuations (∝ N−1/2) [29,31,32]. The formal
solution of (15) can be obtained by standard methods and reads [22]:
τ(z) = 2N
∫ 1−ζ
z
dv eNF (v)
∫ v
0
du e
−NF (u)
(1−ζ −u)(ζ +(2+δ )u) , (16)
where
F (x) ≡ nx−m ln [(2+δ )x+ζ ], (17)
with n ≡ 2δ
2+δ and m≡
4ζ (1+δ )
(2+δ )2 .
The result (16), is valid in both regimes ζ < ∆c and ζ ≥ ∆c, and is particularly
relevant when the persuasion bias δ and the fraction ζ of centrists zealots are
both “small” (e.g. in the range O(N−1)−O(N−1/2)), which leads to an effective
competition between the deterministic nonlinear drift and the diffusive noise. It is
worth emphasizing that in the case of identical biases, centrists do not discriminate
between A and B voters and the MCT is thus a function of x+ y = 1−ζ − z (total
initial density of radical voters) or, equivalently, of the initial density z of C’s. A
particularly interesting situation arises when z → 0 and the system consists of a
vanishing minority of centrists and an overwhelming majority of radical (A and B)
voters. Below, we show that two very different types of behaviors arise: a form of
cultural diversity is maintained over a long period of time when ζ < ∆c, whereas
centrism consensus is quickly reached when ζ ≥ ∆c.
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Fig. 2 (Color online). Functional dependence of the MCT when ζ < ∆c and δA = δB = δ .
(a) τ(z) as function of the (rescaled) initial concentration of susceptible centrists z/(1− ζ ).
Results of stochastic simulations (symbols) averaged over 5× 104 samples are compared with
formula (16) (curves) for (δ ,ζ ) = (0.04,0.02) (×, thick dashed), (0.035,0.02) (△, thin dashed),
(0.06,0.04) (◦, thick solid), and (0.08,0.06) (⋄, thin solid). The population size is N = 500. (b)
Logarithm of the MCT as function of N with ζ = 0.02 and δ = 0.04(◦) and δ = 0.03(△) starting
from a system without susceptible centrists: log10 τ(0) has been computed using stochastic sim-
ulations (symbols, averaged over 1000 samples with N = 100−2000), and is compared with the
predictions of (16) (solid) and the WKB results (26) (×). The (rescaled) asymptotic predictions
(20) are shown as dashed lines.
6.1 Long-lived coexistence and consensus time
We first study the situation where ζ < ∆c or, equivalently, δ > ζ/(1−ζ ). In this
case, the mean field rate equations (2) predict the coexistence of the three opin-
ions with a density ζ/δ of susceptible centrists (see Fig. 1(b)). Here, by paying
special attention to the interesting situation where ζ < δ ≪ 1 and N ≫ 1, we
analyze how this picture is altered by random fluctuations and how centrism con-
sensus is ultimately reached. From the results of stochastic simulations reported
in Fig. 2. it appears that the MCT decreases monotonically with the density ζ of
centrist zealots and increases with the persuasion bias δ . The MCT also appears
to grow steeply (almost exponentially) with the population size N, see Fig. 2(b).
Moreover, the results of Fig. 2(a) indicate that τ ≃ τ(0) when the initial number of
susceptible centrists is small (z ≪ 1−ζ ), which implies that in such a regime the
MCT is essentially independent of the initial density z. Below, these observations
are substantiated by the analysis of the functional dependence of the MCT on δ ,ζ
and N, first by using the Fokker-Planck equation and then with the WKB method.
6.1.1 Mean consensus time with the Fokker-Planck equation when ζ < ∆c
In this section, we analyze the predictions of (16) when ζ < ∆c and z ≪ 1, and
obtain the leading contribution of the mean consensus time in the framework of
the Fokker-Planck equation (15) using a saddle-point approximation.
When N ≫ 1 and ζ < ∆c, the function exp(−NF (u)) has an isolated peak at
u∗≡ ζ/δ and one can Taylor-expand F (u) around u∗ which yields exp(−NF (u))=
exp(−N [F (u∗)+(u−u∗)2F ′′(u∗)/2]. We can use this expansion to evaluate the
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inner integral of the right-hand-side (RHS) of (16) with a saddle-point approxima-
tion, yielding
∫ v
0
du e
−NF (u)
(1−ζ −u)(ζ +(2+δ )u) ≃ e
−NF (ζ/δ )
∫
∞
−∞
du e−(N/2)(u−ζ/δ )2F ′′(ζ/δ ).
In setting the boundaries to ±∞ we have assumed that the peak is sufficiently
separated from the absorbing boundary, i.e. we henceforth assume that ζ/δ is
well separated from the values 0 and 1. By performing the Gaussian integral, the
expression (16) becomes
τ(z) ≃
√
2piN
ζ (1+δ )
e−NF (ζ/δ )
1−ζ (1+δ−1)
∫ 1−ζ
z
dveNF (v). (18)
As F (v) is an increasing function of v on ζ/δ < v ≤ 1− ζ , the main contri-
bution to the integral on the RHS of (18) arises from v ≃ 1− ζ and therefore∫ 1−ζ
z dveNF (v) ≃
∫ 1−ζ
z dveN[F (1−ζ )−(1−ζ−v)F
′(1−ζ )] ∼ eNF (1−ζ )/N. Hence, with
(18), and provided that the initial population does not mainly consist of suscepti-
ble centrists (i.e. if z≪ 1), the leading contribution to the MCT in the realm of the
diffusion approximation is
τ ∼ N−1/2 eNγ(δ ,ζ ) ≡ N−1/2 eN(F (1−ζ )−F (ζ/δ )), (19)
where the functional dependence of the exponent γ(δ ,ζ )≡F (1−ζ )−F (ζ/δ )
is illustrated in Fig. 3.
As we are particularly interested in the limit of weak persuasion biases and
small fraction of zealots, i.e. ζ < δ ≪ 1 (with z ≪ 1− ζ ), the expansion of the
exponent γ yields γ(δ ,ζ )= δ−ζ (1+ ln(δ/ζ ))+O(δ 3). With (19), one therefore
obtains the following asymptotic result when N ≫ 1:
τ ∼ N−1/2 eN(δ−ζ )
(ζ
δ
)Nζ
. (20)
The concise result (20) provides the leading contribution to the MCT in the realm
of the diffusion theory and is valid as long as ζ < δ ≪ N−1/3. According to this
result, the leading contribution to the MCT grows exponentially with the popu-
lation size and with the difference δ − ζ (in a manner that is independent of the
initial condition z, see below), and decreases with ζ . The exponential growth of
the MCT with N(δ − ζ ) is confirmed by the stochastic simulations reported in
Fig. 2, where we find an excellent agreement with the predictions of (16). The re-
sults of Fig. 2(a) also show that the MCT depends “weakly” on the initial density
z of susceptible centrists: in fact, the MCT is found to significantly deviate from
the value τ(0) only when z/(1− ζ ) > 0.7, i.e. in the special case where there is
already an overwhelming initial majority of centrists. In Figure 2(b), we see that
the asymptotic behavior of the MCT when N(δ−ζ )≫ 1 is aptly captured by (20).
Furthermore, to understand the influence of the term (ζ/δ )Nζ on the RHS of
(20), it is worth considering the transformation (δ ,ζ )→ (δ ′,ζ ′) = (δ +α,ζ +α),
where α is a given (small) real number. Under such a transformation, the exponen-
tial term of (20) is left unaltered, but (ζ/δ )Nζ → ((ζ +α)/(δ +α))N(ζ+α) and
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Fig. 3 (Color online). Functional dependence of γ on the parameters δ and ζ when ζ < ∆c
according to (19): γ grows and decreases monotonically with δ and ζ , respectively.
therefore the MCT decreases if α > 0 and increases otherwise. This nontrivial in-
terplay between δ and ζ is confirmed by the results of Fig. 2(a) and is illustrated
in Fig. 3 where we see that the exponent γ decays along the line δ −ζ =constant.
6.1.2 Metastability and WKB treatment when N(δ −ζ )≫ 1
The asymptotic behavior (20) of the MCT has been derived from the solution of
the Fokker-Planck equation (15), by assuming that ζ < δ ≪ 1. In this section, we
use a complementary approach in terms of the Wentzel-Kramers-Brillouin (WKB)
theory [33,34] to obtain the MCT to the next-to-leading order in the limit where
N(δ −ζ )≫ 1 when ζ < ∆c.
While the mean field analysis (2) predicts the stable coexistence of all opin-
ions in this regime, when the population is large but finite, the system lingers
around the coexistence state (with a density ζ/δ of C’s) before centrism consen-
sus is eventually reached. The dynamics is thus characterized by metastability, a
phenomenon that is well described by the WKB method [33]. The WKB approx-
imation is an asymptotic theory frequently used in the semi-classical treatment
of quantum mechanics [33] that is also useful to study stochastic processes [34].
Recently, there have been numerous applications of the WKB approach to study
problems of metastability arising in population dynamics, as well as in evolution-
ary games and population genetics, see e.g. [31,35,32]. As the WKB method has
never been used in the framework of opinion dynamics to the best of our knowl-
edge, we here follow Refs. [31,32] and outline the essence of the method and
show how it can be used to compute the MCT when N(δ −ζ )≫ 1.
The WKB treatment is based on a size expansion of the master equation
(11) using an exponential ansatz for the probability distribution (see (23) and
Ref. [33]). It relies on two main assumptions: (i) the population size is large
(i.e. N ≫ 1) and one can work in the continuum limit; (ii) the system quickly
relaxes toward the metastable state and, from there, reaches the absorbing (con-
sensus) state after a time growing dramatically with N [34,35,31,32]. Here, this
implicitly means that we assume that the initial density of centrists is low enough
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(z≪ 1−ζ ), to ensure that the metastable state is always reached prior to consen-
sus (see Fig. 1). In this setting, the mean consensus time τWKB is the decay time of
the metastable state described by the centrism quasi-stationary probability distri-
bution (QSD) piℓ. The QSD is obtained by approximating P0≤ℓ≤N−ℓζ ≃ piℓe−t/τWKB
and PN−ℓζ ≃ 1−e−t/τWKB [31,32]. Using these expressions in the master equation
(11), one obtains the quasi-stationary master equation
T+ℓ−1piℓ−1 +T
−
ℓ+1piℓ+1−
[
T+ℓ +T
−
ℓ
]
piℓ = 0, (21)
where an exponentially small term piℓ/τWKB has been neglected and we have used
the transition rates (12). The decay time of the metastable state coincides with the
MCT and is given by the flux of probability into the absorbing state, i.e.
τ−1WKB = T
+
N−ℓζ−1piN−ℓζ ≃
∣∣∣∣dT+(1−ζ )dz
∣∣∣∣ pi(1−ζ )N , (22)
where we have used the continuum limit z≡ ℓ/N, piℓ ≡ piNz = pi(z) and T+N−ℓζ−1 ≃
|dT+(1−ζ )/dz|/N, with the continuous rates (13) [31,32]. According to (22), the
calculation of τ requires to solve the equation (21) for the QSD. This can fruitfully
be done using the WKB approach [34], which is based on the ansatz
pi(z)≃A e−NS(z)−S1(z), (23)
where S(z) and S1(z) are respectively the system’s “action” and “amplitude”,
while A is a normalization constant. The action is found by substituting (23)
into (21) and by keeping the leading order in N, which yields T+(z)[eS′(z)− 1] +
T−(z)[e−S′(z)−1] = 0, with S′ ≡ dS/dz [34,35,31,32]. With (13), one thus finds
S(u) =−
∫ u
ln[T+(ν)/T−(ν)]dν = u ln
(
(1+δ )u
u+ζ
)
−ζ ln(u+ζ ). (24)
The constant A is determined by normalization of the Gaussian approximation
pi(z)∼A e−NS(z∗)−(N/2)S′′(z∗)(z−z∗)2 around the metastable state z∗= ζ/δ . A Gaus-
sian integration yields A ∼ eNS(ζ/δ ) and, to leading order, pi(z)∼ e−N(S(z)−S(ζ/δ )).
With (22,24), the leading contribution to the MCT therefore reads [35,31,32]:
τWKB ∼ eNγWKB(δ ,ζ ) ≡ eN(S(1−ζ )−S(ζ/δ )) =
[
(1+δ )(1−ζ )
( ζ
δ (1−ζ )
)ζ]N
(25)
It is worth noting that, to low orders in δ and ζ , the exponent γWKB of (25) reads
γWKB(δ ,ζ )≡ S(1−ζ )−S(ζ/δ ) = (1−ζ ) ln(1+δ )(1−ζ )+ζ lnζ (1+δ−1)
= δ −ζ (1+ ln(δ/ζ ))− (δ 2−ζ 2)/2+O(δ 3).
Hence, the exponents γ of the Fokker-Planck result (19) and γWKB of the WKB
treatment (25) coincide to first (leading) order in ζ < δ ≪ 1, but their next-to-
leading-order contributions are different.
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The calculation of the subleading correction to the MCT (25) is feasible but
more involved. In fact, it necessitates S1(z) and requires to match the ansatz (23)
with the solution of the (21) linearized about the absorbing boundary z = 1− ζ .
Here, we quote the final result and refer to Ref. [31] for a detailed calculation and
a related discussion 4:
τWKB ≃
√
2pi
N
(
1−ζ
ζ
)δ [(1+δ )(1−ζ )]N
(δ (1−ζ )−ζ )2
( ζ
δ (1−ζ )
)Nζ
. (26)
As illustrated by Fig. 2(b), when the population size is sufficiently large and N(δ−
ζ )≫ 1, (26) is in good agreement with the predictions of the FPE and with the
results of stochastic simulations. Two additional remarks are in order:
i. In contrast to the prediction (16) of the diffusion approximation, the results
(25,26) for τWKB only depend on the parameters δ and ζ but are independent
of the initial density of centrists z, and thus are to be compared with τ(0).
This is because the MCT is here computed from the metastable state, which is
certainly always legitimate when the initial population does not consist of an
overwhelming majority of centrists (i.e. provided that z,ζ ≪ 1).
ii. The accuracy of the WKB approximation improves when N(S(1−ζ )−S(ζ/δ ))≫
1, see e.g. [31,32], as illustrated in Fig. 2(b) where it is shown that the WKB
results are more accurate when δ = 0.04 (and N > 1000) than for δ = 0.03.
6.2 Centrism consensus time when ζ ≥ ∆c
When ζ ≥ ∆c, the rate equation (6) is not characterized by an interior fixed point
and the mean field rate equations (2) predict that centrism consensus is quickly
reached (after a short coexistence of the three opinions). This mean field scenario
essentially also holds in a finite population when ζ ≥∆c, as illustrated by Fig. 4(a),
where at fixed N it is found that
– the centrism consensus time τ grows when the density z of susceptible centrists
decays;
– τ decreases monotonically when δ decreases and ζ increases;
– at fixed value of ζ −δ , τ increases monotonically when δ and ζ decrease;
– the parameters ζ and δ appear to have only a weak effect on the MCT when
z→ 0;
– the predictions (16) obtained from the backward Fokker-Planck equations are
in excellent agreement with the results of stochastic simulations.
When ζ > ∆c, the integrals in (16) are difficult to evaluate analytically since the
function exp(−NF (u)) has no isolated peaks and thus no saddle-point approxi-
mation can be carried out. Nevertheless (16) can be studied numerically and it is
4 One slight difference with the generic result given in Ref. [31] lies in the fact that here the
absorbing boundary is at z = 1− ζ . Furthermore, in the final result (26) we have chosen the
same timescale as in Sec. 6.1.1 and divided (22) by N. This allows a direct comparison with the
results of the Fokker-Planck treatment and differs by a factor N−1 from that of [31,32].
19
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
40
80
120
z/(1-ζ)
τ
(z
)
(a)
2 3 4
50
100
150
200
log
10
N
τ
(0
)
(b)
Fig. 4 (Color online). Functional dependence of the MCT when ζ ≥ ∆c and δA = δB = δ .
(a) τ(z) as function of the (rescaled) initial concentration of susceptible centrists z/(1− ζ ) for
various values of δ and ζ . The results of stochastic simulations (symbols), averaged over 5×104
samples are compared with formula (16) (curves) for (δ ,ζ ) = (0.04,0.06)(×, thick dashed),
(0.06,0.08)(◦, thick solid), (0.08,0.10)(⋄, thin dashed) and (0.035,0.08) (∇, thin solid). (b) The
MCT as function of log10 N, with N = 100−10000: starting from a system without susceptible
centrists with (δ ,ζ ) = (0.06,0.08) (◦) and (δ ,ζ ) = (0.08,0.10) (⋄), τ(0) has been computed
using stochastic simulations (symbols) and the formula (16) (solid/dashed lines).
found that when z → 0, i.e. when the initial population consists only of A and B
voters (along with centrist zealots, but no susceptible centrists), one has
τ ∼ lnN, when N ≫ 1. (27)
This result, compatible with the above points (iv) and (v), is confirmed by Fig. 4(b)
where, when N is large and increases, it is shown that
– τ(0) grows linearly with log10 N, with a slope that appears to slightly increase
when ζ and δ decrease, as shown in Fig. 4(b) when N ≥ 1000;
– the formula (16) fully captures the dependence of τ on N for all population
sizes in the range N = 102−104.
7 Mean consensus time in the 3CVM with centrist zealots and asymmetric
persuasion biases
When the biases toward A and B voters are different, i.e. when δA > δB > 0, the
system’s dynamics is described by a bivariate birth-death process characterized by
the master equation (9). The mean time to reach centrism consensus starting with
a population comprising a fraction of x voters of type A and a density y of B-voters
thus obeys the following backward master equation [22]:
τ(x,y) = ∆ +T−x τ(x−∆ ,y)+T+x τ(x+∆ ,y)+T−y τ(x,y−∆ )+T+y τ(x,y+∆ )
+
[
1− (T+x +T−x +T+y +T−y )]τ(x,y), (28)
where ∆ = N−1. Since we consider a finite but large population size (N ≫ 1),
the transition rates T±x,y are the continuous versions of (10), i.e. T+x ≡ (1+ δA)xz,
T−x ≡ x(z+ζ ), T+y ≡ (1+δB)yz and T−y ≡ y(z+ζ ). It is generally difficult to solve
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(28) and even a size expansion is not very useful to make analytical progress. Yet,
the bivariate master equation (28) can be simplified in the limits where x → 0
and y → 0, and the asymptotic behavior of the MCT can be obtained when the
population size is large (see below). In fact, when y = 0 and x = 1− ζ − z > 0,
T±y = 0 while T±x = T∓(z) and therefore τ(x,0) = τδA(z = 1− ζ − x), where τδA
is the solution of the single-variate master equation (14) with δ replaced by δA.
Similarly, when x = 0 and y = 1−ζ − z > 0, one has τ(0,y) = τδB(z = 1−ζ −y).
Building on our knowledge of the case δA = δB (Sec. 6), we know that the solution
of (14) increases monotonically with δ when ζ is kept fixed (see Fig. 2). Since
δA > δB, this implies τ(x,0) = τδA(z = 1−ζ − x)> τ(0,y) = τδB(z = 1−ζ − y).
More generally, at fixed values of z and ζ , the largest MCT is attained when the
population of non-centrists consists of a maximum number of most persuasive
radical voters, i.e. N− ℓ− ℓζ voters of species A. Similarly, the shortest MCT at
fixed values of z and ζ is obtained when the initial sub-population of non-centrists
only consists of N − ℓ− ℓζ voters of species B. Hence, the MCT respectively
increases and decreases with the initial fraction of A-voters and B-voters in the
population, and the quantities τδA and τδB are upper and lower bounds of the MCT[see Eqs (30,31)]:
τδB(1−ζ − x− y)≤ τ(x,y)≤ τδA(1−ζ − x− y), (29)
as illustrated by Figs. 5 and 6, see below. According to this discussion, we no-
tice that a quantitative difference between the cases of asymmetric and identical
persuasion biases lies in the influence of the initial condition: when δA 6= δB, the
MCT depends on the specific initial densities x of A’s and y of B’s (not only on
their sum, as in the symmetric case with δA = δB). In what follows, we show that
when z≪ 1−ζ the asymptotic behavior of the MCT is independent of the initial
condition when N(δA− δB)≫ 1 and N(δA− ζ )≫ 1: In this situation significant
insight into its properties can be gained from the results of Sec. 6 combined with
the mean field analysis of Sec. 4.
7.1 Long-lived coexistence and consensus time when ζ < ∆c and δA > δB
When ζ < ∆c ≡ δA/(1+ δA), the mean field analysis (Sec. 4) has revealed the
asymptotic stability of the state where A-voters and centrists coexist. As seen
in Sec. 6.1, when the population size is large but finite, we expect the coexis-
tence state to be long-lived and to decay after a time growing exponentially with
the population size N (to leading order). If the population initial composition is
(x,y,z) = (1− ζ ,0,0) and only consists of A-voters and centrist zealots, one re-
covers a single-variate process (as in Sec. 6) and the MCT is τ(x = 1− ζ ,0) =
τδA(z = 0), where, in the realm of the Fokker-Planck equation, τδA(z) is directly
inferred from (16) using
τδ (z) = 2N
∫ 1−ζ
z
dv eNFδ (v)
∫ v
0
du e
−NFδ (u)
(1−ζ −u)(ζ +(2+δ )u) , (30)
with
Fδ (u) ≡
(
2δ
2+δ
)
u− 4ζ (1+δ )
(2+δ )2 ln [(2+δ )u+ζ ]. (31)
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Fig. 5 (Color online). Functional dependence of the mean consensus time when ζ < ∆c and
δA > δB, with ζ = 0.02. (a) The MCT as function of the rescaled initial density z/(1− ζ ) with
the ratio x/y held fixed, see text. Here, (δA,δB) = (0.04,0.03) with x = y (◦) and y = 1.5x (×),
the population size is N = 500. The results of stochastic simulations (symbols) averaged over
2.5× 104 samples are compared with the results obtained for δA = δB = 0.04 (△, solid) and
δA = δB = 0.03 (⋄, dashed). The analytical results (solid and dashed lines) are based on (30,31).
(b) Logarithm of the MCT as function of N (with N = 100− 2000) for the same parameters as
in (a): log10 τ(x+ y = 1−ζ ) computed using stochastic simulations (◦, ×) averaged over 103
samples is compared with the predictions of (30,31) for δ = 0.04 (solid) and δ = 0.03 (dashed).
Similarly, if the initial state is (x,y,z) = (0,1−ζ ,0), one has τ(0,1−ζ ) = τδB(0).
Since δA > δB and τδ ∼N−1/2eNγ(δ ,ζ ), with an exponent γ =Fδ (1−ζ )−Fδ (ζ/δ )
that grows monotonically with δ when ζ is fixed (see Sec. 6.1 and Fig. 3), one
has τ(x,0) = τδA(0) ∼ N−1/2eNγ(δA,ζ ) ≫ τ(0,y) = τδB(0) when N(δA−δB)≫ 1,
N(δA−ζ )≫ 1, and the initial density of susceptible centrists is vanishingly small
(z→ 0).
In the case of a population with an arbitrary initial density (x,y,z) of A,B
and C’s, the system almost surely reaches the metastable state (a∗2,b∗2,c∗2) = (1−ζ − ζ/δA,0,ζ/δA), as prescribed by the mean field equations (2) [see (3) and
Fig. 1(a)], before reaching centrism consensus. Hence, the less persuasive of the
radical voters (B’s) quickly disappear from the population and the metastable state
only consists of centrists and voters of the most persuasive party (A’s). Apart
from the short transient necessary to reach the metastable state, the MCT is thus
obtained from the mean time to reach consensus starting from the fixed point
(a∗2,b∗2,c∗2) where the population comprises only A-voters and centrists. In this
situation, when N(δA− δB)≫ 1 and N(δA− ζ )≫ 1, the leading contribution to
the mean consensus time τ(x,y) is obtained from a single-variate backward mas-
ter equation [like (14) of Sec. 6] and is given by τδA(z) with (30). In particular,
when the initial density z of susceptible centrists is very small (i.e. z ≪ 1− ζ )
with N(δA−δB)≫ 1 and N(δA−ζ )≫ 1, one has τ(x+y≃ 1−ζ )≃ τδA(0) and,
from the results (20) and (25), we infer the leading contribution to the MCT when
δB < δA ≪ 1 and ζ ≪ 1:
τ(x+ y≃ 1−ζ )≃ τδA(0)∼ N−1/2 eN(δA−ζ )
( ζ
δA
)Nζ
. (32)
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Fig. 6 (Color online). Functional dependence of the MCT when ζ ≥ ∆c and δA > δB, withζ = 0.08. (a) The MCT as function of the rescaled initial density z/(1−ζ ) with the ratio x/y held
fixed, see text. Here, (δA,δB) = (0.04,0.03) with x = y (◦) and y = 1.5x (×), the population size
is N = 1000. The results of stochastic simulations (symbols), averaged over 3.5×104 samples,
are compared with results obtained for δA = δB = δ = 0.04 (△, solid) and δ = 0.03 (⋄, dashed).
The analytical results (solid and dashed) are based on (30,31). (b) τ(x+y = 1−ζ ) as function of
N in a semi-logarithmic scale for the same parameters as in (a). Results of stochastic simulations
(symbols) for N = 100−10000 are compared with τδB(0) (thin solid) and τδA (0) (thick and, as
a guide for the eyes, dashed line) obtained from (30,31), see text.
The results of stochastic simulations reported in Fig. 5 corroborate the above anal-
ysis. In fact, Fig. 5(a) reveals the dependence of the MCT on the initial conditions:
τ grows monotonically with z−1 and x/y, but exhibits only a weak dependence on
x/y. Moreover, the comparison with the case of identical biases illustrates that
τδB(z = 1− ζ − x− y) ≤ τ(x,y) ≤ τδA(z = 1− ζ − x− y) which confirms (29).
Fig. 5(b) shows that asymptotically the MCT grows exponentially (to leading or-
der) with the population size when N(δA − δB)≫ 1, N(δA − ζ )≫ 1 and z → 0,
in full agreement with the behavior τ(x+ y = 1− ζ )≃ τδA(0) predicted by (30)-(32). The figure 5(b) also illustrates that the asymptotic behavior of the MCT is
independent of the ratio x/y and therefore of the detailed composition of the initial
population.
7.2 Mean consensus time when ζ ≥ ∆c and δA > δB
When ζ ≥ ∆c, the only stable fixed point corresponds to centrism consensus.
From the analysis of Sec. 6.2, we know that in a finite population with initial
composition (x = 1− ζ ,0,0), the MCT is τ(1− ζ ,0) = τδA(z = 0) and can be
obtained from (30). Similarly, for an initial composition (0,y,0), the MCT is
τ(0,1−ζ ) = τδB(z = 0). When N ≫ 1 and the initial number of susceptible cen-
trists is small, i.e. z = 1−ζ − x− y → 0, we have seen in Sec. 5.2 (see Fig. 4(b))
that τδA(0)∼ τδB(0)∼ lnN. Furthermore, according to (29) τδA and τδB are upper
and lower bounds of the MCT. The results of Sec. 6.2 hence imply
τδB(0)≤ τ(x+ y≃ 1−ζ )≤ τδA(0), and therefore
τ(x+ y≃ 1−ζ )∼ τδA(0)∼ τδB(0)∼ lnN, when N ≫ 1. (33)
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These findings are corroborated by the results of stochastic simulations re-
ported in Fig. 6 that confirms (29): τδB(z = 1− ζ − x− y) ≤ τ(x,y) ≤ τδA(z =
1−ζ − x− y). The dependence of the MCT on the initial conditions is illustrated
in Fig. 6(a) where τ(x,y) grows monotonically with z−1 and x/y (held constant).
We notice the dependence on x/y is particularly weak. Fig. 6(b) confirms the log-
arithmic growth with N of the MCT when the population size becomes very large,
in full agreement (33). In particular, the symbols in Fig. 6(b) are found to be
aligned parallel to the thick and dashed lines when N ≫ 1, which implies that
asymptotically eτ(x,y) ≃ Q(x,y)eτδA(0) or τ(x,y) ≃ τδA(0)+ lnQ(x,y), where the
function Q depends weakly on the initial densities (x,y).
8 Conclusion and discussion
After having reviewed the main properties of the paradigmatic voter model and of
some of its generalizations accounting for zealotry, commitment and incompatibil-
ity (Section 2), we have studied how a committed minority may resist a persuasive
majority and how the resulting competition influences the maintenance of cultural
diversity. Here, this line of investigation has been carried out in the framework
of the three-party constrained voter model with “centrist zealots”. In fact, follow-
ing the basic idea of the bounded-compromise and three-party constrained voter
models, we have considered that individuals of two radical parties (A and B) are
incompatible among them and compete to impose their consensus by convincing
centrists that, in turn, can convince A’s and B’s. To reflect the fact that radical (A
and B) voters are more persuasive than centrists, we have considered that there
are persuasion biases δA and δB toward opinions A and B (with δA ≥ δB). Fur-
thermore, we have also assumed that the population includes susceptible centrists
(C) and a small fraction ζ of centrist zealots (Cζ ). Whereas C’s can radicalize and
adopt either the state A or B, centrist zealots are committed individuals that always
remain centrists and oppose the formation of any consensus that is not centrism.
Hence, the persuasion of A’s and B’s is resisted and opposed by the commitment
of centrist zealots. This results in a subtle competition between commitment and
persuasion that has been studied in the mean field limit and in a well-mixed pop-
ulation of finite size N (on a complete graph).
In an infinitely large population, there is a continuous transition between a
coexistence (“multicultural”) phase, that is stable when the fraction of centrist
zealots is below the critical threshold ∆c = δA/(1+ δA), and a phase where cen-
trism prevails when ζ ≥ ∆c. This scenario changes in finite populations when
demographic fluctuations ultimately lead to centrism consensus. The competition
between commitment and persuasion is thus characterized by the mean consensus
time and has been investigated in terms of single-variate and bivariate birth-death
processes. The case of identical persuasion bias has been thoroughly analyzed and
the mean consensus time has been computed in the realm of the diffusion theory
(Fokker-Planck equation) and with the WKB method. In a large population, it
has been shown that the long-time dynamics of the case with asymmetric biases
(δA > δB > 0) can be described in terms of a single-variate birth-death process
involving only centrists and A-voters. Hence, the asymptotic behavior of the mean
consensus time in a large population and its upper and lower bounds have been
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obtained analytically also when δA > δB. In fact, the main difference between
the cases δA = δB and δA > δB lies in the composition of the metastable state: it
is characterized by the coexistence of A-voters and centrists (no B-voters) when
δA > δB, whereas voters of the three parties coexist when the persuasion biases
are identical (δA = δB).
Our findings, can be summarized as follows: When the fraction of centrist
zealots in the population of size N is low (ζ < ∆c), we have shown that the in-
terplay between commitment and persuasion results in a metastable coexistence
(multicultural) phase. The mean consensus time thus corresponds to the decay rate
of the metastable state and, when centrists are initially in the minority, it has been
shown to grow as τ ∼ N−1/2eNγ(δA,ζ ) with an exponent γ determined explicitly.
When the biases are asymmetric, the less persuasive of the radical voters (B’s)
quickly disappear from the population and the metastable state only consists of
centrists and voters of the most persuasive party (A’s), whereas opinions of all
parties coexist when δA = δB. On the other hand, when ζ ≥ ∆c, the system attains
centrism consensus in a time that scales logarithmically with the population size,
i.e. τ ∼ lnN. These features are found to be robust since they neither depend of the
detailed initial composition of the population nor on the weakest persuasion bias.
It is worth noticing that a similar type of behavior concerning the mean fixation
time has recently been found in evolutionary games and in models of population
genetics, see e.g. Refs. [32,36].
In conclusion, while the mean consensus time of the three-party constrained
voter model without zealots scales linearly with N, we have here shown that the
presence of small fraction of zealots and the existence of persuasion biases results
in a rich dynamics characterized either by a prolonged maintenance of a multi-
cultural phase, or by a quick realization of centrism consensus. The long-lived
coexistence state generally consists of voters of the party supported by the most
committed individuals along with the most persuasive voters. Since the descrip-
tion of the (meta-)stability of the multicultural phase and the mean time to reach
the consensus cannot be obtained solely from the mean field rate equations, this
work illustrates the relevance of statistical physics methods to study problems of
“opinion dynamics”.
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